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As its subtitle indicates, Imperfect Justice appears in the form of a diary
that tells the story-largely through the "self-presentation of people deeply
involved in the socialist legal system" (p. 3)--"of the sudden death of so-
cialist law in East Germany" (p. 1). Markovits's diary is intended to capture
"the reactions, hopes, and fears of some of [East Germany's] survivors" (p. 1)
immediately before and after the GDR's collapse. The diary-like format,
based on personal observation and interviews of an unstructured and non-
random nature, is likely to be seen by some critics as its chief weakness.
First, its focus on such a narrow slice of time says little about the long-range
prospects for the development of a liberal constitutional order in Eastern
Germany. Second, its emphasis on the personal stories of East Germans
when they were most vulnerable to the vicissitudes of change tends to in-
duce a false sympathy for persons who had been, after all, the willing func-
tionaries of a repressive regime.
To leave the matter there, however, would devalue the real merit of
this book. Markovits's lucid portrayal of the hopes and fears of GDR profes-
sionals reveals an important side of reunified Germany and, as we shall see,
it has serious implications for the future of liberal constitutionalism in Ger-
many as a whole. As for the GDR's oppressive features, Markovits allows
that they "cast their shadows" over all her interviews, and she makes plain
her own low opinion-even contempt-of those among her respondents
who offered no apology or confessed no shame for the GDR's excesses. But
she also tells us that these excesses are outside her main concern. Her inter-
est lies rather in the normal operations of socialist law, what she describes as
its "non-scandalous everyday aspects" (p. 3)-aspects admittedly ignored by
most Western writing on the GDR. It is precisely this study's emphasis on
the system's normality, as seen through the eyes of the persons interviewed,
that stamps it with a mark of historical importance.
What also makes Imperfect Justice an important record is the perfect fit
between the writer and her topic. Inga Markovits is a German-born profes-
sor of law in the United States and an acknowledged authority on East
Germany and its legal system (Markovits 1971, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1996). In
the 1970s she examined the GDR's "struggle to transform an inherited sys-
tem of bourgeois law into a socialist civil law system" (p. 1). Now, years
later, she would look into the dramatic reversal of that process and do so as
it occurred. She happened to have been in Berlin shortly after its infamous
Wall came down, with unification appearing on the horizon. Recognizing
the importance of the moment, she arranged to spend a year in East Berlin
"to sketch the last portrait of a legal system about to disappear into the belly
of history" (p. 3). East Berlin was a good place to sketch the portrait, for the
shock waves of dislocation caused by reunification were felt most strongly
there.
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Markovits's journal begins on September 6, 1990-a month before the
GDR disappeared-and ends on June 20, 1991, nine months after its
eclipse. During this critical period, she interviewed judges, prosecutors, and
legal scholars; observed the dismantling of the old legal system and the in-
stallation of a new one; and even played the role of a participant-observer
when she was recruited to serve on a faculty committee charged with re-
viewing the records of East German law professors who were anxiously
awaiting notice of their dismissal or reappointment. Although her daily en-
tries focus on the discrete experiences of particular persons, they also con-
vey a sharp sense of the formative legal context in which various legal
professionals carried out their official duties.
EAST GERMANY'S LEGAL TRANSFORMATION
It will help at the outset to place Markovits's account within the larger
context of institutional reform and political reorientation that the Unity
Treaty prescribed for East Germany. Imperfect Justice should also be under-
stood-and assessed-within the still larger context of the spirited intellec-
tual debate in Germany over the meaning of the GDR's past and its
significance for the future of German democracy. We may begin with a brief
summary of the Unity Treaty's provisions for legal reform in the old GDR,
reserving until later in this essay a discussion of the intellectual debate
about the German past.
The Unity Treaty's article 13 provided that "administrative bodies and
other institutions [in the GDR] serving the purposes of public administra-
tion or the administration of justice" would henceforth be placed under the
administrative jurisdiction of the reestablished Eastern states, or Lander.
This provision covered almost every major area of the GDR's public life,
including the civil service, courts of law, prosecutorial offices, state-funded
legal research institutes, and university law faculties. These institutions were
now to be reorganized by the eastern Lander on the basis of West German
law. In addition, the treaty called for the dissolution (Abwicklung) of admin-
istrative units rendered obsolete or superfluous owing to the required gov-
ernmental remodeling (Unity Treaty art. 3 [Protokoll zu art. 13]). To soften
Abwicklung's impact, employees of a dissolved unit would receive 70% of
their salary for six months while waiting to be transferred to another admin-
istrative division. Because East Germany's bloated civil service would be
"downsized" to West German levels, the prospect of these employees regain-
ing employment in the public sector was, as it turned out, a forlorn hope.
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The Public Service
In reorganizing the public service in the East, the new all-German gov-
ernment had a delicate balancing act to perform. "On the one hand," as
Peter E. Quint notes (1997, 176), "the complete dissolution of GDR institu-
tions could squander or impair a generation of intellectual resources. On the
other hand, retention of existing structures could perpetuate incompetence,
pockets of totalitarian ideology, and the results of political favoritism." The
Unity Treaty tried to do the initial balancing. Employees of retained units
were permitted to remain in their posts until screened for competence and
political reliability. Before receiving permanent appointments, however,
they were required to undergo a three-year probationary period, whereas
employees of dissolved administrative units were likely to have their con-
tracts altogether terminated (Public Servant Dissolution Case 1992, 133-59).2
Public employees could be summarily dismissed under the terms of the
Unity Treaty if they had violated the principles of humanity incorporated in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Unity Treaty, attachment 1, ch. 19(A), para.
3(1)(5)(1)). In the view of many West Germans, this would cover acts of
political repression and even ordinary collaboration with the Ministry of
State Security (StaSi). 3 Under the Treaty, East German public servants-
including judges, prosecutors, and law professors-were to be dismissed on
these grounds and often over the objection that at the time they had been
acting in accordance with GDR law. One important ground for dismissal
would be participation in any decision rejecting a GDR citizen's application
to leave the country or engaging in an act of reprisal against the applicant.
Public servants would also be dismissed if they were discovered to have been
card-carrying members of the ruling communist party (Sozialistische Einheit-
spartei [SED]). (Almost all the GDR's legal professionals had belonged to
the SED.) German labor courts generally took the position that GDR citi-
zens who had held important posts in the SED or had performed more than
routine tasks for the Stasi could be barred from most positions in the recon-
stituted civil service (Quint 1997, 172-76).4
2. In an action challenging these dismissals, the Federal Constitutional Court sustained
the validity of the Unity Treaty's general provisions calling for the dissolution of certain
administrative units, but held that public servants in particularly difficult circumstances, espe-
cially pregnant women and mothers with small children, were constitutionally entitled to
continued employment in the public service.
3. The Unity Treaty included a special section on the Stasi. See attachment 1, ch.
19(A), para. 3(1)(5)(2).
4. Whether public servants-judges and legal scholars among them-could be dis-
charged for mere membership in the SED was the subject of yet another judgment of the
Federal Constitutional Court. In reviewing lower-court decisions sustaining such dismissals,
the court held that neither party membership, party office, nor ordinary collaboration with
the state or the Stasi would by itself be a sufficient reason for automatically discharging per-
sons from their public service positions (See Stasi Dismissal Case 1995, 140-57).
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Among the many civil servants who lost their jobs were legal scholars
associated with state-run legal research institutes and professors in univer-
sity "law sections" (Meador 1986, 53-59).5 Prior to unification, only the
universities of Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, and Jena had law faculties, with Ber-
lin's Humboldt University having been reserved mainly for the training of
judges and prosecutors. The GDR regime had abolished the law faculties of
other East German universities, such as Potsdam and Greifswald. When
these faculties were reestablished in reunited Germany, they were staffed
almost entirely by West Germans, many of them docents (a teaching rank
below that of professor) eager to step into newly created Eastern professor-
ships and so advance their careers far more quickly than would have been
possible in the West.
The Judiciary
Reorganizing the GDR's judiciary was no less cataclysmic than remod-
eling the civil service and the universities. First, the entire judicial system
was swept away and replaced by the FRG's system of specialized courts-
ordinary civil and criminal courts as well as separate hierarchies of adminis-
trative, fiscal, social, and labor courts-and more formalized procedures and
traditions. Second, given the GDR's Marxist-Leninist oriented system of
legal education, in which fields such as property, commercial, and adminis-
trative law were relatively unimportant, few East German judges seemed
prepared to preside over the new courts. With the closing down of most
GDR courts on October 3, 1990, nearly all of East Berlin's 150 judges were
summarily suspended pending a full review of their political loyalty and pro-
fessional credentials, while their pending caseloads were transferred to West
Berlin's courts. The eastward extension of West Berlin's courts required the
appointment of an additional 215 professional judges, totaling 1,307 in Ber-
lin as a whole. With certain exceptions to be noted later, nearly all the new
judges were West Germans. To the dismay of many East Berliners, who were
beginning to feel that they were being colonized by the West, hundreds of
Western-trained lawyers also took up positions in East Berlin, specializing in
areas of law such as contract and tax, the sounds of which grated on the ears
of good socialists.
East Germany's vast system of nonprofessional social courts, staffed by
300,000 lay judges engaged in mediating disputes in work places and resi-
dential areas, was also abolished when Germany reunited (Meador 1986,
5. Under various GDR educational reforms, "faculties" of law were replaced by "sec-
tions" that in turn were divided into "departments" based on subject matter. Humboldt Uni-
versity's Law Section included departments of criminal law, labor law, economic law,
international law, agricultural cooperative and land law, and the theory of law and state.
834 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
140-45; Richert 1983).6 This extensive system of lay judges was one reason
for the GDR's small number of full-time practicing attorneys. In 1989, they
barely numbered 600 in a nation of 16.7 million citizens, 7 amounting to a
ratio of 1 lawyer to 28,000 citizens, as opposed to the FRG's 1 practicing
lawyer for every 1,000 citizens. East Germany, unlike the FRG, was not a
litigious society (Markovits 1996, 2284).8 Social solidarity and collective
harmony, as Professor Markovits points out, were more important than pri-
vate advantage or individual autonomy. Private law and personal rights
count for much more in the FRG, a reality reflected in the field of legal
education, the structure of substantive law, and the organization of the
judiciary.
THE RESOCIALIZATION OF EAST GERMAN JUDGES
Markovits spent most of the GDR's last 25 days in East Berlin's central
courthouse viewing trials and looking for judges and other legal personnel
willing to talk about their official duties, their images of themselves, the
impending shutdown of their courts, and their chances of continuing their
careers after reunification. She found the judicial corridors filled with an
atmosphere of gloom and frustration: gloom because bags were being
packed, legal guidebooks were being tossed into waste bins, some judges
were abandoning their posts, and a system of socialist justice was coming to
an abrupt end; frustration because many pending cases would not be fin-
ished in time to avoid the expense and uncertainty of new proceedings in
the courts of the FRG.
East Germany's Trial Process
In these "last days"-the title of the book's first section-Markovits
witnessed several trials in ordinary civil suits. As we view these proceedings
through her eyes, we see serious and solicitous judges trying to keep mar-
6. They were not courts in any West German sense; rather, they were designed as alter-
native dispute resolution boards "to enforce socialist standards of behavior through education;
it [was] not their primary purpose to settle disputes through an adversarial process." Lay
judges were not new to East Germany; they have been a traditional feature of the German
judiciary. In the FRG, as in the GDR, lay judges have long served alongside professional
judges in the regular judiciary, especially criminal tribunals.
7. The figure of 600 refers to practitioners serving the general population. Other lawyers,
known as Justitiar, served as in-house attorneys in state-run enterprises. They were engaged
mainly in rendering advice to employers (i.e., state managers) and employees (Meador 1986,
146-47). In 1989, there were around 3,000 such lawyers in the GDR.
8. In her recent study of GDR lawyers, one based largely on her detailed analysis of court
records in the city of Liritz, a pseudonym, Markovits emphasizes that East Germans pursued
actions in court far less often than West Germans. She also found that in 1979 lawyers repre-
sented only 15.3% of all civil litigants and a mere 5.6% of all criminal defendants.
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riages from breaking up, work out child custody agreements, bring about
friendly settlements in disputes between citizens and the state, and preside
over cases challenging the dismissal of employees under East Germany's La-
bor Code. Along the way, she interviewed several of the presiding judges,
most of them women in midcareer, who willingly talked of their professional
roles and public lives.
Given the values of socialism, we are not surprised at her finding that
the judges saw themselves more as mediators than as referees. Their view of
the judicial role contrasted sharply with the Western model: They preferred
dialogue to argument, personal narrative to abstract reasoning, solidarity to
conflict, social integration to efficiency, substantive justice to formal proce-
dure, community welfare to individual rights, settlement to ongoing contro-
versy, and compromise to a winner-take-all position. Reflecting the didactic
character of the trial process, civil procedure was also found to be simpler
than in West Germany; its object was social peace and instruction in how
people should get along with their socialist neighbors. Much could be said
in favor of these humane practices, and perhaps the GDR's judges had every
right to expect some reconciliation between their values of solidarity and
altruism and those of autonomy and competition prevailing in the West,
but no such convergence seemed possible in the face of the GDR's sudden
demise.
As noted earlier, Markovits has not ignored the darker side of the judi-
cial process in the GDR. She tried hard to elicit reactions to frequent tales
about judges who imposed punishments or abandoned trials in response to
the demands of political officials. Her respondents, however, resisted sug-
gestions that they could be induced to decide particular cases in given ways
on instructions from political operatives. Markovits was told that state in-
spectors had reviewed the records of most courts and that conversations
about particular cases had taken place between judges and party officials;
nevertheless, she believed that on the whole, socialist judges exercised in-
dependent judgment, free of overt political influence.
Her respondents were well aware of the arbitrariness and injustices of
certain judicial decrees but, as one of them allowed, lack of legal restraints
in sensitive "political" areas had not infected her work as a judge presiding
over ordinary civil and criminal cases. This seems plausible in a dual state
where judicial practice in accordance with law coexisted with political con-
trol of the judiciary, as was the case in Nazi Germany (Fraenkel 1941). That
respect for law was more than a marginal reality in the GDR seems implicit
in Unity Treaty provisions retaining GDR laws and judicial decisions that
were compatible with the rule of law and the Basic Law.
In a larger ideological sense, however, as Markovits's respondents were
quick to concede, all law is ultimately political, a point well taken when law
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is viewed within a self-contained system such as capitalism or socialism.9
Moreover, these respondents betrayed little doubt, mistrust, or anxiety over
the essential goodness of the socialist system of justice. Yet it seems improb-
able that East German judges did not now and then compromise their inde-
pendence, as the evasive responses to the interviewer's more pointed
questions about their roles would seem to suggest. For example, some judges
and prosecutors seemed untroubled by the fact that persons who had legally
applied to emigrate lost their jobs. Nor were they particularly disturbed by
orders withdrawing the courts' right to hear appeals in labor cases contesting
such firings. Nor did their concept of judicial independence bar membership
or activity in the Communist Party.
The GDR's judges and prosecutors no less than its legal academicians
moved in lockstep with the regime, and I have the impression, after "listen-
ing" to Markovits's respondents, that most of them lacked the intellectual
independence that might have prompted them to rethink aspects of the
system they served. Their acceptance of socialism was so complete that they
were trapped by their unwillingness to imagine another way of organizing
the life of law and society. They were the victims of a false consciousness,
drugged by the belief that the system they served was basically beneficent,
and that essential beneficence could not be challenged. In short, they could
tolerate the sufferings of people who dared to question the system and even
excuse the penalties against them as justly deserved.
Vetting the Judiciary
In any event, the screening of East German judges who wished to re-
tain their judicial posts was inevitable and indeed required by the Unity
Treaty. Some 360 GDR judges and prosecutors who applied for admission to
Berlin's judiciary were examined by a judicial screening committee-a body
consisting of judges and elected officials chosen by Berlin's parliament-in
cooperation with the city-state's Senate Administration of Justice. A veto of
an applicant by either of these bodies-a two-thirds vote was required for
approval in the screening committee-would defeat his or her reemploy-
ment. There was of course grave doubt that Eastern-trained judges could
measure up to the high standards of the FRG's legal system, for which rea-
son all were required to enroll in retooling classes taught by Western judges,
lawyers, and professors. 10
9. Lest we forget, American critical legal studies scholars have often pointed to the in-
separability of law and politics in American judicial decision making (Kelman 1987).
10. Professional judges in the GDR received their training in a special four-year course
of Marxist-oriented study in East Berlin's Humboldt University. Judges were elected to their
positions for five-year terms in constituencies under party control. Party affiliation and class
identification appeared to be important criteria of selection (Meador 1986,136-37). By con-
trast, FRG judges are chosen for life (i.e., until the compulsory retirement age of 68), largely
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Equally serious-and problematical-was the issue of political suitabil-
ity, in regard to which Markovits, to her dismay, was unable to extract from
any Western overseer a clear statement of the criteria used in "determining
who among the candidates is acceptable to the Rechtsstaat" (p. 140); accord-
ingly, it seems, Berlin's Eastern prosecutors and judges were reduced to de-
pending on the good will of their Western examiners. For some, the act of
filling out questionnaires, answering questions about their past, facing tests
of loyalty to the FRG, and being pronounced "fit" or "unfit" to remain
members of the German judiciary would be a humiliating experience. Older
judges would take early retirement rather than submit to this ordeal. Some
examiners the author interviewed failed to treat their Eastern colleagues as
equals, spoke of them with condescension and, as she notes, refused to re-
gard them as "part of the rule-of-law community" (p. 144).
Eastern applicants who were otherwise professionally acceptable and
willing to admit the shortcomings of socialist legality, manifesting the ap-
propriate degree of contrition for their own "mistakes," and demonstrating
in word or demeanor that they would faithfully serve the German Rechts-
staat, could probably count on-although they could never be sure of-
reemployment as a judge or prosecutor. But if they stuck to their guns, ex-
uded arrogance, defended the past, refused to recognize the errors of social-
ism, or voiced doubts about the FRG's system of justice, they were almost
sure to be disqualified. They were decidedly out of a job if their records
showed that they had issued arrest warrants for persons accused of certain
border violations or handed down severe sentences for political crimes such
as possessing subversive literature, suppressing opposition views, trying to
flee the GDR, or maintaining contacts with West German institutions.
Even applicants who defended their continued membership in the Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS)-successor to the old SED-would find em-
ployment unlikely in East Berlin's reorganized judiciary, notwithstanding
the PDS's legitimacy under the Basic Law. With these "standards" operat-
ing, few GDR prosecutors or judges were in any position to succeed against
their Western competitors for responsible positions in Berlin. What made
the experience even more irritating-and unjust in Markovits's view-is
that many of the applicants were not informed as to precisely why they were
being rejected.
From the present account, it appears that few eastern applicants were
given the benefit of any doubt. But, an unsympathetic reader might re-
spond, why should they have been presumed blameless? As Markovits her-
self writes-and laments-the "post-Honecker reform government under
Hans Modrow ... had ordered the cleansing of all East German personnel
files." Fearing a "witch-hunt" after reunification, East German judges, like
on the basis of merit and after having survived a rigorous six-year program of theoretical study
and practical training and three additional years of service as an apprentice judge.
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other public servants, "followed the decree's invitation with a vengeance."
As she adds, it seemed as though they "must have been motivated by the
wish to facilitate new beginnings by erasing memories of a distasteful past"
(p. 141). Thus, in screening Eastern applicants, Western examiners had lit-
tle to go on except interviews, questionnaires, and available court records.
And, we need to remember, the judiciary, far more than the ordinary public
service, was the main engine of the communist legal system.
Still, as Peter Quint notes (1997, 184), "[rjetention of large numbers of
judges from the east would be essential" if "proliferating disputes [such as
those] over property questions arising from the Unity Treaty" were to be
resolved quickly and equitably. As he reports, only 17% of the Eastern ap-
plicants for Berlin positions "were permitted to resume their work for a pro-
bationary period," whereas the approval rate in other East German Lander
was between 41 and 63% of all applicants seeking to continue on in the
judiciary (Quint 1997, 187). Markovits's interviews in Brandenburg also es-
tablished the relative leniency of the vetting there compared to the rough-
shod approach in Berlin. The different treatment of holdover officials in
East Berlin may have had something to do with trying to fit them into an
existing government; in other East German Linder, where West Germans
were fewer in number, the competition was not as intense.'
DECONTAMINATING THE LEGAL ACADEMY
Most of Markovits's diary entries focus on her interviews with legal
scholars and her experience on the Humboldt law faculty's screening com-
mittee. We should, however, distinguish between legal scholars associated
with non-university research institutes and those associated with university-
based faculties of law. These two groups were treated differently. As for the
institutes, the Unity Treaty provided that they would be evaluated "to de-
termine their academic merit and viability in a united Germany" (art. 38),
the evaluation to be overseen by the FRG's independent and influential
Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat). Recall that under the Unity Treaty,
governmental units could be dissolved without apology if they were no
longer needed or were unacceptable for academic or political reasons. Be-
yond the pale of acceptability were Potsdam-Babelsberg's Academy of Law
and State and the Institute of State Security in Potsdam-Eiche. Both were
unceremoniously dissolved,12 although several faculty members from the
Babelsberg Academy were hired by Potsdam's new law faculty.
11. The harsh standards applied in Berlin might also be attributed to the "hard-nosed"
leadership of Jutta Limbach, Berlin's seemingly unforgiving minister of justice, a Social Demo-
crat who in 1994 was elected president of the Federal Constitutional Court, in part because of
her aggressive campaign of judicial reform in Berlin's eastern sector.
12. Also dissolved, and on the Science Council's recommendation, was the GDR's
Academy of Science, a centrally controlled research organization consisting of 24,000 schol-
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Structuring the Process of Review
Partially in response to the dissolution of these state-supported research
institutes, several Eastern universities also embarked upon a campaign of
dissolution and reform. Particularly controversial in Berlin's Humboldt Uni-
versity, as Markovits notes, was the dissolution of five academic depart-
ments considered beyond repair for ideological reasons and their subsequent
reconstitution with new personnel. Peter Quint (1997, 179) writes that "the
effect of 'dissolving' some faculties was 'in one blow' to replace eastern with
western personnel-and, given the traditional gender structure of western
faculties, it was also, in many cases, to replace women with men."
But could a university department be "dissolved" with the intention of
rebuilding it with new staff from West Germany? Several Berlin professors
challenged the legality of these dissolutions, 13 charging that they violated
treaty provisions requiring the individualized evaluation of persons em-
ployed by retained units or agencies. Berlin's Administrative Court of Ap-
peals agreed: On June 6, 1991, as Markovits reports, the court "stopped the
closure of the Humboldt University's five 'politically tainted' faculties" (p.
165), a decision that relied on language in the Federal Constitutional
Court's judgment of April 24, 1991. Even so, she feared that in "the long
run" Berlin's Senate would "very likely do with Humboldt University as it
pleases" (p. 166). Markovits's comment undoubtedly stems from her experi-
ence as part of the self-review process in Humboldt University's law faculty.
In January 1991, at the urging of Rosemarie Will, dean of the Humboldt law
faculty, she agreed to include her name on the ballot from which the re-
viewers would be selected. The faculty elected her as one of four internal
professors to serve on an eleven-member committee that included four ex-
ternal members, all from the FRO. Dean Will, controversial in her own
right because of her previous membership in the SED, thought that at least
two Western scholars among the four internal members would "raise the
ars, academic assistants, and employees organized into disciplinary units, including a section
on "law and the state." Some 500 of the Academy's scholars and employees whose jobs and
departments were being terminated or reconstituted contested the decision in the Federal
Constitutional Court. As in the Public Servant Dissolution case (1992, 133-60), the Court
found that the procedures employed in dissolving or rebuilding various scientific institutes
were necessary to bring research and science up to the traditional standards of academic gov-
ernance and achievement in West Germany. But once again the Court invalidated the dis-
missal of pregnant women and new mothers. In addition, it extended the employment
contracts of persons who had been given insufficient notice of their dismissal and thus little
time to find alternative employment.
13. Quint writes, "But even after their Abwicklung [dissolution] in mid-winter 1990-91,
the "dissolved" faculties did not actually suspend operation. Rather, newly appointed 'found-
ing deans' from the west decided which former faculty members would be retained on interim
short-term contracts, while the principal courses were often taught by visiting professors from
the west. Permanent appointments were then made pursuant to the recommendations of an
academic 'founding commission' under the leadership of the western 'founding dean' (1997,
178).
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Committee's reputation in the eyes of distrustful West Berlin observers" (p.
112).
The committee's task, like that of other departmental investigating
boards, was to assess the "professional competence" and "personal qualifica-
tions" of each member of the law faculty. Employees of the law department
were permitted to retain their posts pending the review. Any person wishing
to remain in the department's employ was required to appear before the
committee. Its recommendations would then be submitted to the law de-
partment's faculty council. A negative decision could be appealed to the
university's central review commission, which in turn received its mandate
from Humboldt's academic council. The last word remained in the hands of
Berlin's Senate Administration.
Standards of Review
Markovits found the committee's task both formidable and frustrating:
formidable because the committee was given just a few weeks between Janu-
ary and March of 1991 to determine "who among 106 members of this once-
socialist university is suitable and deserving to continue to work in a
cleansed and democratized academy" (p. 128); frustrating because, as with
the vetting of judges, no criteria were set forth in advance of evaluating the
"entire lifework" of these men and women. The committee relied on per-
sonal interviews, curricula vitae, and other information supplied by the can-
didates themselves, but its hearings took place within a general atmosphere
of animosity and distrust. A not uncommon attitude was a West Berlin pro-
fessor's admonition "against a repetition of that misplaced forgiveness which
Germans once before displayed toward former Nazi functionaries" (p. 89).
Others, including some Eastern reformers, advised a total housecleaning in
which few if any of the current staff would be rehired. Ultimately defining
its own mandate, the committee tried conscientiously to navigate between
the shoals of sensitivity and bluntness. Fully recognizing the imperfect jus-
tice of its own efforts, Markovits ambivalently remarked, "May those whom
we have done injustice forgive us" (p. 128).
In the end, the committee defined its mandate narrowly. It focused on
"a person's ability and willingness to adjust to the demands of a bourgeois
legal system" (p. 130). Committee members looked for evidence of personal
integrity even while realizing that "legal scholarship and teaching [in the
GDR] had played an important role in the law's corruption" (p. 131). It was
therefore "right to focus our investigation on the question of whether erst-
while servants of the system could now plausibly be integrated into the new
Rechtsswat" (p. 131).
But how was that to be determined? In part, Markovits writes, by look-
ing for "misuse[s] of political and intellectual authority" and also by requir-
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ing "the right mixture of guilty feelings and self-confidence," for "we
became suspicious if someone too breezily identified with his former self' (p.
137). The process was a hit-and-miss affair, and Markovits herself appears
to have had doubts about the vetting procedure and perhaps even the valid-
ity of the committee on which she served so conscientiously and respon-
sibly. "Why should two Wessis, coming from another world, and a number
of colleagues whose lives and careers were just as much in shambles as their
own," she asked, "now be in a position to select those who should be al-
lowed to keep their jobs and those who should lose them? What legitimated
us to make such life-shattering decisions?" (p. 133).
Even the formal legality of these committees has been questioned. Pe-
ter Quint observes that some of them "had no legal authority and, in the
end, little influence." He writes that "most decisions on scholarly achieve-
ment were in essence made by western experts in accordance with tradi-
tional [western] criteria," and "even if the candidate fully satisfied the
criteria of professional achievement and political suitability . . . there was
still the question of whether there was a 'need' for the individual's work
according to the plans of the newly structured university or institute"
(Quint 1997, 179-80). By some estimates, no more than a fifth of the old
faculty was retained in most reconstituted departments; nearly all the new
hires were Western Germans.
The Final Reckoning
The committee on which Markovits sat found that 10 of 28 professors
lacked "sufficient personal integrity" to remain on the law faculty (p. 136).
Other Humboldt professors appear to have been rejected at higher levels of
the review process, whereas some refused altogether to appear before the
committee. Still, she tells us, "I do not see how we could have done our job
better" (p. 138). Even her Eastern colleagues agreed that some sort of
screening was necessary if GDR faculties were to be brought up to speed
academically and the worst pockets of ideological encrustation removed.
That this objective could not be achieved with surgical precision should not
in my view count as an argument against the process itself. The procedures
used by the committee appear to me less offensive than the wholesale atti-
tude of some Western examiners that East Germans had little or nothing of
value to contribute to the reform of the old GDR's legal academy.
What Markovits did find offensive-and in her view violative of the
Basic Law's guarantees of equal protection and academic freedom-was a
Berlin Senate statute that effectively "disenfranchise[d] East Berlin profes-
sors at the very moment in their history when they should learn to do free
scholarship in a free society" (p. 195). Specifically, the statute barred East
Berlin professors from voting on matters of university self-governance if
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they had not yet been reappointed under the new procedures laid down by
their Western overseers. Accordingly, faculty members who rose to professo-
rial rank under East German rules were relegated to second-class status,
however "seriously committed [they might have been] to the search for sci-
entific knowledge and insight." In defense of the law, one Berlin official
interviewed by the author appeared to take the position that "Humboldt
University professors are not scholars within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion" (p. 196).14
What was the final result in Humboldt University? The present diary,
which ends abruptly in the summer of 1991, leaves the complete story un-
told. It may be remarked, however, that those professors and employees who
received positive votes were not immediately dismissed, although many of
them began to leave the University voluntarily. Of the former socialist
professors on the law faculty, only four remained. Meanwhile, Berlin's min-
ister of science rejected several of the persons selected to fill new chairs in
the law faculty, three of whom were discovered to have had Stasi contacts,
but two of these managed to sue their way back into the university. Many
middle-level employees such as lecturers and assistants who were on limited
contracts eventually left the university, while older employees were phased
out with offers of early retirement. Finding it difficult to land other aca-
demic jobs, many took up the practice of law.' 5
COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST
Imperfect Justice is a sensitive and sensible account of the thoughts and
experiences of East Germans jolted by a sudden political transition. By mag-
nifying the sorrows and frustrations of particular persons in the East, and
also by highlighting the snobbery and suspicions of many in the West, the
diary captures a central reality of reunification in the old GDR. But not the
whole reality; a diary such as this cannot be expected to emphasize the
systemic disorders that paralyze and deform a body politic. And we should
14. Humboldt faculty members affected by the law filed a constitutional complaint
against it in the Federal Constitutional Court. It was dismissed on procedural grounds.
15. These data are based on information Inga Markovits was kind enough to pass on to
me in her letter of October 9, 1996. A similar story could be told of other Eastern German law
faculties. The old law faculties of Halle, Jena, and Leipzig went through a rebuilding process
not unlike Berlin's Humboldt University. Newly founded law faculties in Dresden, Frankfurt
(am Oder), Greifswald, Potsdam, and Rostock universities were revived in partnership with
western law faculties and under the direction of founding deans from the West. Dresden's
experience was typical. Law professors from Freiburg, Heidelberg, Tulbingen, and Mannheim
volunteered to hold lectures in Dresden while a fresh, permanent faculty was being assembled
and a new library founded and staffed. By 1994, 13 newly appointed professors from West
Germany had replaced the temporary faculty. Only one professor-an employee from Dres-
den's former Institute of Licenses and Patent Law-was hired by the new faculty. For the
details of the founding of the Dresden law faculty, see Fakultat flir Rechtswissenschaft (no
date).
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also bear in mind that Markovits's respondents were not ordinary folks; they
were legal professionals, members of the SED, and part of the governing
elite of an undemocratic and repressive political regime. As sorrowful as
their personal stories have been, they were nonetheless responsible, at least
in some measure, for the sins of the regime as a whole.
Even at the level of academic law, GDR professors had seriously com-
promised their independence. Markovits is on point in remarking that "legal
scholarship and teaching [in the GDR] had played an important role in the
law's corruption" (p. 131). She adds that academic law's defilement started
with the "infamous Babelsberg conference" of 1958, when legal scholarship
was placed in the service of both state and SED. "It is depressing," she
writes, "to see how readily East Germany's legal academics who had just
timidly begun to find their feet, played along in the vicious game" (p. 107).
What she had to say about legal academics could as easily be said of judges
and lawyers. "Even [their] abstract and harmless words," she reminds us,
"can link to form a spider's web of intellectual conformity that may choke
an entire political system" (p. 171).
What then does a democratically elected successor regime do with such
persons? The respondents in the present diary have no blood on their hands;
they are beyond the reach of criminal law, indeed of any legal process. Many
were simply opportunists. At the very most, they may be said to have helped
to spin the "spider's web" that choked the political system. But that is not a
crime. Any attempt to charge them under some provision of West German
law would go against the rule-of-law principle, nulla poena sine lege (no pen-
alty without a law), and violate the Unity Treaty to boot. But should the
GDR's legal professionals be held accountable in some other way? In the
way of the "imperfect" vetting process, for example, that Markovits de-
scribes and the justice of which she often doubts?
Perhaps the question can be placed in perspective by turning briefly to
some of the post-unification debates over the nature of the GDR's past
(Torpey 1993, 7-20; Probst 1993, 21-33; McAdams 1993a, 49-60). One
version of the past holds that East Germany was a virtual prison from which
people could escape only at their peril and in which resistance was futile or
impossible, generating an image of autocratic rulers holding sway over inno-
cent and helpless subjects. Once liberated, the way to justice is to punish
the "prison's" jailers. This vision seems to have driven the initial West Ger-
man effort to prosecute the GDR's leaders and to hold ordinary soldiers
responsible for using lethal means to stop persons from fleeing the country.
Belying this interpretation, however, was the discovery that hundreds of
thousands of ordinary citizens had cooperated with the regime in spying on
their neighbors.
An opposing version of the past holds that almost everybody volunta-
rily went along with the regime because this was the only way to live a
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moderately acceptable and productive life in the GDR. In short, as Viclav
Havel said of his compatriots in Czechoslovakia, "everyone in his or her
own way is both a victim and a supporter of the [old communist] system"
(1989, 53).16 Since under this reasoning everybody collaborated with the
regime to some extent, nobody can be singled out for special guilt except
those found to have committed crimes or abused their offices in an egre-
gious manner. This interpretation, also widely accepted in West Germany,
evokes sympathy for ordinary East Germans and a willingness to "forget and
forgive" their compromises and sins of omission. Again, this interpretation
is reflected in the effort to apprehend and punish the most conspicuous
violators of human rights.
Still another version, shared by many of the GDR's former communists
and some of their Western supporters, envisions the old GDR as a bastion of
anti-fascism that invited unsavory comparisons with the "creeping fascism"
encouraged by West Germany's "formal bourgeois democracy." For many of
East Germany's intellectuals who accepted this view, the GDR's militant
communism contrasted sharply with what they regarded as the FRG's "half-
hearted" effort to deal with Germany's Nazi past. They often recognized the
deficiencies of the socialist state but nevertheless believed in its essential
rectitude. Like many Western intellectuals writing on German affairs, they
had accepted the reality and legitimacy of the GDR. Because they embraced
its professed goals of justice, peace, and solidarity, they often muted their
opposition to its oppressive practices and policies out of fear of alienating
the SED and upsetting the spirit of detente between the two German states.
In the minds of East German dissidents responsible, at least in part, for
the GDR's downfall, each of these versions distorts history. The dissidents
and their politically progressive compeers reject any reconstruction of the
past that would ignore the heroism, resistance, and basic decency of those
East Germans who managed to live honorably in the GDR. They are in-
clined to view the "purge" that has taken place under largely Western aus-
pices as "victor's justice" and one that lacks any "nuanced analysis of the
past as a legacy of 'merit and mettle' as well as 'guilt and spinelessness"'
(Torpey 1993, 13). They insist on fixing responsibility where it belongs-
moral and political as well as legal-while incorporating East Germany's
heritage of democracy and dissent into the political culture of united
Germany.
The GDR reformers who engineered East Germany's velvet revolu-
tion-many of whom, incidentally, opposed reunification in the hope of
democratizing the existing regime-viewed the Abwicklung's process and
16. With respect to East Germany, Jane Kramer reports, "The Stasi [i.e., the office of
internal security and their secret informers] were everywhere, and, for all practical purposes,
they were everybody. Every church had Stasi, and so did every farm, factory, hospital, school,
and housing project, and every political party with honorary access to the Communist parlia-
ment" (1996, 164).
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vetting procedures described in Markovits's diary as a predominately West-
ern effort to place the burden of the past entirely on the GDR and to re-
lieve the FRG of any moral culpability for the condition of political
servitude in which so many East Germans found themselves for so many
years. To ignore the "good" side of the GDR's past-for example, its anti-
fascism, enlightened humanism, and commitment to equality-they say,
marginalizes those good people of the GDR who otherwise might have been
expected to shape a more vigorous tradition of civic responsibility in Ger-
many as a whole.
What is going on here is no less than a struggle over the "politics of
memory." Any final declaration of moral and political-as opposed to crim-
inal-guilt may well determine whose version of the past prevails. But no
one version is likely to prevail. If the West German experience is any guide,
"coming to terms" with the past-whatever that may mean to some peo-
ple-will be a long-range project involving a rethinking of the causes for
the postwar division of Germany and including a study of the policies that
governed the relationship between the two German states in the following
40 years (McAdams 1993b). There is also the difficult question of who the
GDR's authentic revolutionaries really were. The writers and other profes-
sionals who fled to the West over the years? Or those who remained behind
in the hope of transforming the socialist state even as they cooperated with
it? As for the latter, their cooperation may have been one condition of their
capacity to reform the system or, barring that, to contribute to its humaniza-
tion. Seen from this perspective, one can easily sympathize with the plight
of many of the legal professionals that Markovits interviewed.
On the other hand, given the velocity of the constitutional changeover
in the GDR, it is difficult to imagine a regime of corrective justice that
could have measurably improved the processes that Markovits observed and
recorded. For one thing, the process in Germany seemed more balanced
than in either Poland or Czechoslovakia. The Czechs placed all former
communists under a blanket five-year government employment ban,
whereas the Poles imposed hardly any restrictions at all (Rosenberg 1995,
3-121). Markovits's diary shows that the Germans at least tried to individu-
alize the process of finding "guilt" and "innocence." Overall, they made an
honest effort to abide by rule-of-law principles in reviewing the records of
East Germany's legal professionals. And when these principles were shame-
lessly ignored, or when dismissals from the public service resulted in ex-
traordinary hardships on certain classes of employees, the Federal
Constitutional Court stepped in to redress the wrong (Public Servant Dissolu-
tion Case; Judgment of February 21, 1995).17
17. More recently, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled against disbarring lawyers who
had done no more than file periodic reports with the Stasi on conversations heard and activi-
ties reported in the course of their daily business (Bar Admission Case, 1995: 213-248).
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Far more disconcerting than the vetting process itself, in my view, was
the arrogant and self-righteous attitude of many of Markovits's Western re-
spondents. This attitude blinded them to the merits of the judicial practices
she observed in socialist courtrooms. And who is to say whether West Ger-
man lawyers and judges were better models of morality and justice than
their East German colleagues? Were they any less political in their devotion
to a capitalist legal order than were socialist legal professionals to their legal
order? What is to be gained in comparative legal analysis by contrasting an
ideal-type Western legal system with the empirical reality of a socialist sys-
tem? If the socialist system had been assessed in terms of its ideals rather
than behavior, perhaps the comparison between the legal orders of East and
West Germany would have revealed fewer differences (Scheppele 1996).
Saying this, however, is not by any means to suggest that the vetting proce-
dures used in East Germany were inappropriate or unfair.
What then should be our final assessment of the "trials" and events
witnessed in Berlin? A part of me sympathizes with Markovits's sensitive
and charitable view of many of her respondents. Some were scoundrels, but
others were upright and compassionate individuals dedicated to the com-
mon. good as they saw it. Those who believed deeply in socialism and its
values of solidarity and equality could be charged with no more than invin-
cible ignorance, thus freeing them of moral responsibility for the Unrechts-
staat's misdeeds. Those who were vincibly ignorant and had now seen the
light could also be excused because they were able and willing to make their
own distinctive contribution to reunified Germany. Even more deserving of
our sympathy are East German legal professionals who had not only opposed
the injustices of the former GDR but who by their post-reunification behav-
ior could be counted on to serve the FRG with diligence, commitment, and
distinction.
With respect to the latter, Markovits has in mind persons such as Rose-
marie Will, who with "energy and direction.., redesigned and staffed in
one short and turbulent year [Humboldt University's law curriculum]" (p.
198). Ms. Will, however, has not given up those socialist values that she
thinks could humanize the FRG's political economy as well as its legal sys-
tem. Since the publication of Imperfect Justice, she has continued to advance
professionally. She clerked for two years at the Federal Constitutional Court
and was recently nominated to Brandenburg's constitutional tribunal. Her
nomination, however, has triggered stiff opposition because of her prior
membership in the SED and current sympathies for its successor, the PDS.
Her opposition comes not only from Christian and Free Democrats but also
from some Eastern Social Democrats who feel that she compromised herself
by loyal and faithful service to the GDR (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 14
Sept. 1996, 4). Although the normal politics of judicial recruitment is at
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work here, many view it as unfair that her past-free of any hint of villainy
or abuse of office-should continue to haunt her in the present.
On the other hand, part of me agrees with the skeptics. After all, the
GDR's legal professionals represented and embraced a political order that
subordinated the individual to the state. They also served a socioeconomic
order that reduced people to little more than cogs in an enormous machine.
East Germans may have had full employment and bread, but what is this to
compare with the wounded and corrupted freedom that was the lot of most
persons stripped of their dignity because they could not read, travel, or go to
church for fear of losing privileges or risking imprisonment? W(hat then is
wrong with barring persons who profited from this system from holding po-
sitions of public responsibility and trust in a democratic Rechtsstaat? Bruce
Ackerman, liberal constitutionalist that he is, even suggests that such per-
sons may not be entitled to individualized faultfinding. "If service in a lead-
ership position is established," he writes," we know that the apparatchik has
benefited from a system that oppressed the majority." He continues:
Since his past efforts at leadership led the country to economic and
political catastrophe, why is it unfair to allow others to take leading
positions in the new regime? Indeed, the group-oriented character of
this strategy will even redound to the advantage of the discharged ap-
paratchiks themselves. They will not suffer from the kind of stigma
that typifies case-by-case faultfinding. Rather than ruining the reputa-
tions of individual officeholders, the proscription approach simply
forces them to find their own way in the emerging market economy.
(1992, 96).
Ackerman's counsel would seem to be a morally acceptable way of dealing
with the GDR's legal professionals.
But in the special case of Germany, would such an approach foster the
trust and confidence needed to build on the FRG's existing democracy?
Those East Germans who took the risk of opposing the GDR regime, and
also those who simply retained their personal integrity, need to know that
they too belong to the new Germany. All former residents of the GDR
willing to live and work under the sign of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) must
be made to feel that existing constitutional standards and rights apply to
them as much as to any of their Western cousins. Needless to say, the inte-
gration of a prior dictatorial regime into a stable democracy is far from an
easy process, and perfect justice in this situation is an end unlikely ever to
be achieved. Perhaps the best that can be expected is imperfect justice, the
hurts and woes of which Inga Markovits has described with such insight and
candor.
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